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Abstract 
 
This paper empirically examines how an individual’s economic, social and political capital affects the 
propensity to make bribe payments in exchange for public services. Using an individual-level survey 
on bribes, the econometric results suggest that the burden of bribery is borne by the poor, but 
substantially decreases when institutions that constrain bureaucratic corruption are strong and 
effective. The results also show that bribery incidences decrease when social capital is high but 
increase when political networks are prevalent. These findings support the need to combine anti-
corruption reforms with poverty reduction strategies in order to foster equity in public services 
provision in Kenya. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The theoretical debate on who bears the cost of bribery in public service delivery has culminated with 
two contrasting hypotheses. One line of argument posits that the burden of bribery is borne by the rich 
and those who are politically connected, as they can afford to ‘grease the wheels’ and circumvent costly 
bureaucratic red tape. Bribery is perceived to be an outcome of a rational process which enhances 
efficiency, especially in countries with weak institutions and accountability mechanisms (Leff, 1964; 
Rose-Ackerman, 1978). However, a competing argument postulates that the burden of bribery is borne 
by the poor as they significantly depend on public services due to income constraints and costly exit 
options to alternative private suppliers (Myrdal, 1968; Hirschman, 1970). Bribes are therefore perceived 
to ‘sand the wheels’ and generate adverse welfare implications (Meon and Weill, 2010; Deininger and 
Mpunga, 2005). Reconciling these conflicting arguments on who bears the burden of bribery remains 
challenging and disappointing, despite its importance in the design of sound anti-corruption reforms. At 
the theoretical level, most studies are grounded on a uni-dimensional approach in economics, sociology 
or political science. At the empirical front, micro-level data which matches the incidence of bribery with 
public service delivery and income levels is largely unavailable. This paper reconciles this debate by 
providing empirical evidence which takes into account these diverse dimensions. 
 
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, it examines how economic, social and political factors 
affect an individual’s likelihood to pay a bribe in exchange for public services such as health, education, 
water, security and permits in Kenya. The main emphasis is placed on economic factors, which are 
captured by a multi-dimensional index of poverty and deprivation. Second, the paper investigates how 
accountability mechanisms can deter bureaucratic corruption and promote an egalitarian access to public 
services across local government counties. Given that neither theory nor empirics provides a clear 
guidance on these aspects, this paper develops a conceptual framework which depicts the determinants 
of bribe payments when bureaucrats interact with citizens and then extends the model to illustrate how 
the introduction of accountability mechanism modifies the nature of this relationship. 
 
This paper explores a recent and original survey conducted at the individual-level to test the validity of 
the model’s prediction. The empirical analysis, which is based on binary logistic models, exploits 
variations in public service provision using a large random sample of 44 local government counties. It 
focuses on Kenya for several reasons. First, although the country is perceived as one of the most 
corrupt, ranking 145 out of 175 in the global transparency international index, limited empirical analysis 
on the incidence of bribery has been conducted due to data unavailability (TI, 2015). Most authors focus 
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on grand corruption, an approach which is unable to detect bureaucratic corruption
1
 at the county level. 
Second, related studies examine the burden of bribery at the firm level (Sequeira and Djankov, 2014; 
Ufere et al. 2012), and thus fail to capture the micro-level relationship between bureaucrats and 
ordinary citizens. Third, recent studies examining bribery in public service provision have adopted a 
cross-country approach (Justesen and Bjornskov, 2014; Hunt and Laszlo, 2012), making interpretation 
difficult due to differences in the definition of corruption across countries, cultural settings and time 
periods (Donchev and Ujhelyi, 2014; Sequeira, 2012). In fact, while such pitfalls may be mitigated by 
employing a within-country analysis, such an approach is surprisingly lacking in the literature. 
Finally, most studies in the literature are either conducted at the macro level (Sekkat and Meon, 2005) 
or lack any rigorous analysis which can yield evidence-based policy recommendations. 
 
The empirical results generate three main findings. First, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the 
results lend support to the hypothesis that bribery is a function of an individual’s income, and its 
likelihood increases with poverty levels. The empirical results point out to a poverty-bribery trap, 
where poor individuals are 6.9% more likely to pay a bribe in exchange for a public service. Second, 
the results reveal that the burden of bribery systematically varies with the type of public service. 
Bureaucrats seem to pursue third price discrimination and the poor are more likely to pay bribes in 
exchange for health and education - services which the rich are likely to exit and seek alternative 
(private) suppliers. Third, the results indicate that countervailing accountability mechanisms such as 
civil society movements and an independent media are instrumental in reducing bureaucratic corruption. 
These findings are robust to changes in econometric technique and specifications as well as inclusion of 
multiple control variables. 
 
These findings contribute to the literature on bureaucratic corruption and accountability in public service 
delivery in several dimensions. First, at the conceptual level, the study presents an analytical framework 
which combines the traditional economic approach to corruption (Rose–Ackerman, 1975, 1978) with a 
political economy model based on Hirschman (1970). Such an approach emerges to be useful in 
reconciling a wide range of contradictory results on the micro-level determinants of bribe payments. The 
conceptual framework posits that in localized provision of public services, the propensity to extract 
bribes not only depends on the social-economic and political status of individuals, but it is also 
contingent on the type of the public service being offered.  
 
Second, the study contributes to an emerging theoretical and empirical debate on the role of political and 
social capital in driving corruption in developing countries. The current literature is split on whether 
such networks provide perverse incentives for bribery through elite capture or lower the incidence of 
                                                          
1
 In this paper, bureaucratic corruption is used interchangeable with the term bribery. Other forms of corruption 
such as embezzlement or nepotism are not considered. 
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bribery by promoting trust and norms of civic cooperation which constrain bureaucrat’s behaviour 
(Knack and Keefer, 1997). Consistent with Putnam (1993), the empirical results lend support to the 
hypothesis that social capital in the form of religious organizations is associated with lower likelihood to 
bribe while political capital increases bribery as self-interest motives are associated with interest groups, 
a finding consistent with the theoretical proposition by Olson (1982). 
 
Third, it contributes to the empirical literature which quantifies the determinants of bribe payments in 
public service provision (TI, 2015; Justesen and Bjornskov, 2014; Hunt and Laslzo, 2012). In contrast 
with most studies which are based on perception indices, the methodology adopted in this paper relies 
on an experience-based survey, and thus mitigates the problem of perception and cognitive biases 
such as the bandwagon and halo effects (Sequeira, 2012; Treisman, 2007). Finally, it adds value to a 
bourgeoning body of literature on behavioural science which argues that corruption is contagious, and 
individual’s decision to engage in bribery depends on the anticipated behaviour of others (de Sardan, 
1999, Serra and Ryvkin, 2012; Lambsdorff, 2012).  
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical determinants of bribery 
while section 3 presents the conceptual framework. The empirical strategy is presented in section 4 
while the results are discussed in section 5. Robustness checks are conducted in section 6 while 
section 7 concludes with policy implications. 
2. Related Literature 
Corruption in Kenya remains prevalent despite concerted national efforts to fight the vice. While 
notable success has been achieved in eliminating corruption at the firm level, bureaucratic corruption 
at lower levels of governance is still persistent, perpetuating inequality in access to public services. In 
order to address this problem, the government adopted a new constitution in 2010, whose hallmark 
involved devolving power and public service provision from the central government to 47 newly 
created local counties. As per the constitution, devolution would promote ‘good governance, integrity, 
transparency and accountability, enhance checks and balances, promote social and economic 
development through the provision of proximate, easily accessible services and prevent corruption in 
the provision of public goods and services’ (GoK, 2010, various pages). Consistent with the literature, 
this re-orientation of public service delivery from a top-down to a bottom-up system would reduce the 
scope for corruption by enhancing political accountability, responsiveness to local needs and 
increasing participation of citizens in local governance (Faguet, 2014). This would change the 
structure of incentives bureaucrats and politicians face, and thus lead to efficient service provision. In 
addition, it would generate inter-local government competition and thus reduce the scope for 
corruption. And yet, despite this policy initiative, recent empirical studies analysing corruption in 
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Kenya show that bribery has steadily soared over the past years, resulting in uneven development 
across most local counties (TI, 2015; Hope, 2014). 
 
2.1 Why bribery in public service provision occurs 
 
At the theoretical level, an extensive body of literature identifies three pre-conditions for corruption to 
occur. These include discretionary power where bureaucrats exercise bestowed authority to design 
and administer regulations, the existence of economic rents which are prone to capture by special 
interest groups and accountability mechanisms whose capacity to detect and impose sanctions is weak 
(Becker, 1968; Jain, 2001). While discretionary power and economic rents create incentives for 
corruption to thrive, the quality of the accountability system influences the cost of corruption. The 
interaction of these factors determines the payoffs for bureaucrats to engage in bribery.  
 
Following the influential works of Rose-Ackerman (1975, 1978) and Klitgaard (1988), variation in 
corruption can be explained by the degree of discretionary power in the allocation and regulation of 
public services. Derived from a principal-agent model, it is assumed that there exist a ‘goal conflict’ 
between principals (citizens) who are guided by public interest and agents (bureaucrats and 
politicians) who are motivated by self-interest. The principal-agent model hypothesizes that due to 
information asymmetry, agents may not fully disclose information to the principals, generating 
incentives to be corrupt. As discussed by Persson et al. (2013, p.452), ‘corruption occurs when an 
agent betrays the principal’s interest in the pursuit of his or her own interest’. The principal-agent 
model thus presupposes that bureaucrats and politicians are the key drivers of corruption, a problem 
exacerbated when principals lack effective instruments to hold them accountable. A theoretical model 
by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) shows that discretionary powers also act as a channel of 
transferring corruption from the central government to local politicians in localized systems of public 
service provision. 
 
The second pre-condition relates to the amount of rents to be extracted. Rational bureaucrats engage 
in bribery if the benefits of being corrupt outweigh any costs, a phenomenon which occurs when the 
value of rents is high (Jain, 2001). For instance, Bardhan (1997) shows that competition between 
different government agencies in providing public service lowers rents and in its absence, bureaucrats 
have incentives to engage in bureaucratic corruption due to the increase in the amount of rents to be 
extracted. Such rents may have different implications, as argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1993) who 
distinguish between corruption with and without theft. In the case of corruption without theft, bribes 
act as a tax, implying that the cost of a public service comprises its official cost plus the bribe. As a 
result of the increase in price, the burden of bribery is likely to fall on rich individuals, while the poor 
might be totally excluded. However, in the case of corruption with theft, bureaucrats offer public 
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services for less than the official price, implying that both rich and poor individuals are better off 
bearing the burden of bribery. 
 
The third prerequisite relates to the level of accountability, which to a large extent depends on the 
strength of political and legal institutions - as they determine the probability of detection and sanction. 
Theoretical predictions argue that when politicians are elected by local constituents, the degree of 
accountability is high as public officials have the incentives to provide public services in an honest 
manner, given that their career prospects hinge directly on the local citizens and not on the central 
government (Wallis and Oates, 1988). In addition, the close proximity between citizens and 
bureaucrats enhances accountability by reducing information asymmetry since the costs of monitoring 
the behaviour of bureaucrats are low (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000). In fact, Seabright (1966) 
argues that due to repetitive interactions, local citizens are able to correctly infer strategic behaviour 
of bureaucrats and use such information to sanction or reward them in democratic elections. The 
possibility of sanctioning in turn fosters downward accountability and ‘dramatically tightens the loop 
of accountability between those who produce public goods and services and those who consume 
them’ (Faguet, 2014, p.5).  
 
But while accountability is often perceived in terms of electoral competition, most African countries 
are characterized by infrequent voting, malpractices such as rigging, absence of term limits and 
prevalence of nominated rather than elected politicians and bureaucrats (O’Donnell, 1994). As a 
result, Bratton and Logan (2006, p.2) argue that elections ‘constitute a blunt instrument for enforcing 
accountability’. In the presence of such constraints, Alam (1995) presents a theory of countervailing 
actions which links accountability to intermediary institutions and social organizations such as 
community groups and independent media outlets. Such platforms, which are also discussed by 
Diamond (1999) and Brett (2009) foster citizen participation by revealing information regarding 
politics and bureaucratic procedures and thus solve collective action problems which normally 
perpetuate corruption.  
 
Alam’s theory aims to examine ‘how actions taken by losers might work to resist and set limits on 
corruption’ (p. 420). This approach contrasts with traditional theories which advocate for vertical 
accountability – elections - or horizontal accountability - checks and balances within the government. 
Corresponding to the classical work of Hirschman (1970) on the role of exit, individual’s actions such 
as relocating and seeking public services from non-corrupt officials, seeking substitutes from 
alternative suppliers or foregoing consumption of public services can alter the structure of incentives 
faced by government bureaucrats and reduce corruption. Conversely, in line with Hirschman’s use of 
voice, individuals who bear the burden of bribery can result to ‘confronting corrupt officials with 
evidence of their corrupt activities, taking complaints about corrupt officials to their superiors or 
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courts, facilitating media reports about corrupt acts or officials, or by using violence, threat, or 
organized campaigns against corrupt officials’ (p.426). Such countervailing strategies can deter 
corruptive behaviour by increasing the probability of detection and sanction. Empirical evidence by 
Kneller et al. (2007) and Reinikka and Svensson (2004) suggest that high levels of information 
dissemination can improve accountability by informing citizens about bureaucratic procedures and the 
cost of public services. 
2.2. Theoretical propositions on who bears the burden of bribery 
2.2.1 Rich individuals: The economist argument  
 
The mainstream approach dominating the literature argues that the burden of bribery is borne by rich 
individuals. Pioneered by Leff (1964) and later formalized by Rose-Ackerman (1975, 1978), the rich 
pay bribes in order to overcome bureaucratic rigidities and provide ‘the much needed grease for the 
squeaking wheels of a rigid administration’ (Bardhan, 1997, p.1322). It is argued that this leads to 
allocative efficiency and can foster individual productivity. The theoretical intuition behind this 
argument as discussed by Becker (1968) and Lui (1985) is that the rich conduct a cost benefit 
analysis, where bribes reflect their opportunity costs. The benefits of bribery may arise if rich 
individuals incentivize bureaucrats to provide services they ought to (speed money) or to provide 
services that they are not entitled to - for instance a driving licence even after failing a test. Therefore, 
a key implication is that given bureaucratic inefficiencies, individuals with high income and wealth 
status will pay bribes in order to save time and effort by avoiding cumbersome regulations. In other 
words, the burden of bribery is borne by rich individuals who in turn re-allocate their resources to 
high productive activities.  
 
An expanding body of empirical literature lays support to this argument. For instance, Hunt and Laszlo 
(2012) find that rich individuals in Uganda incur the cost of bribery as they frequently interact with 
government bureaucrats relative to the poor. The authors show that the rich pay bribes in order to avoid 
deliberate delays in processing documents. In a cross-country analysis of developing countries, Meon 
and Weill (2010) find evidence in support of the ‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis and show that in 
countries with less effective institutions and accountability frameworks, bribe payments by the rich are 
associated with efficiency gains. Hunt (2010) examine the burden of bribery in Uganda’s health sector 
and find that the rich are 1.2% points more likely to pay bribes than the poor, although their analysis 
is restricted to a comparison between public and private health facilities. In a case study of Peru, Hunt 
and Laszlo (2012) find that although rich individuals are four times more likely to pay bribes 
compared to poor individuals, although bribes by the poor constitute a large proportion of their 
income. 
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However, the argument that the burden of bribery falls on rich individuals due to efficiency reasons is 
often criticized on several grounds. First, speed money generates perverse incentives, as bureaucrats 
may deliberately introduce more delays and red tape in order to increase opportunities for extracting 
bribes. Second, (Bardhan, 2006) argues that bribes are ‘implicit contracts’ and due to their secretive 
nature, they are not legally enforceable, implying that bureaucrats have vested interests in not 
committing to them. Third, evidence by Mutonyi (2002) shows that the rich spend substantial time 
negotiating with corrupt bureaucrats and this offsets any efficiency gains. In Kenya, empirical 
evidence by Hope (2014) suggests that the rich are less likely to bear the burden of bribery as they 
either form part of the bureaucracy, the political elite or possess resources which enable them to 
acquire information and solve information asymmetry problem which drives corruption. The author 
also provides suggestive evidence that bureaucrats may be unwilling to extort the rich, as their income 
status may reflect a high social class and thus increase the probability of detection and sanction. 
 
2.2.2 Poor individuals: The social inequality argument 
 
While the economist approach is grounded on the ability to pay bribes, a competing view advanced by 
social scientists argues that the burden of bribery is borne by the poor. Three main premises support 
this argument. First, the poor face income and credit constraints, an aspect which inhibits them from 
accessing financial markets and privately provided services. Recognizing this, bureaucrats capitalize 
on their discretionary power to demand bribes on users of public services (Smart, 2008). Second, the 
poor face costly exit options. As discussed by Paul (1992), such costly exit options could be attributed 
to spatial variations, where most poor individuals reside in remote areas where only public services 
produced by natural monopolies (for instance water or electricity supply) are available. Third, 
following Olson’s (1965) proposition, the poor are more likely to face bribery demands due to 
collective action problems as they are unable to mobilize themselves and sanction corrupt bureaucrats. 
Even when mobilized, they are less willing to vote or simply vote on the basis of ethnicity or religious 
attributes. In fact, according to the neo-institutional economics theory discussed by Shah (2006), the 
poor suffer from bounded rationality as they face high transaction costs which hinder the acquisition 
and processing of information. As a result, this generates perverse incentives for the better informed 
bureaucrats to demand bribes from the poor. Finally, Peiffer and Rose (2014) argue that the poor lack 
financial knowledge to differentiate between official prices from bribery and are therefore more likely 
to get extorted. 
 
In a theoretical model by Justesen and Bjornskov (2014), the authors show that due to reduced 
purchasing power arising from low incomes, poor individual significantly rely on public services, and 
this acts as a signal to corrupt bureaucrats to engage in bribery. They show that bribes paid by the 
poor signify a deadweight loss, as they constitute an inefficient transfer of resources. Thus bribes tend 
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to act as a regressive tax and can result to the poor being excluded from public services. Using a panel 
of 18 sub-Saharan African countries, the authors find that the poor are 2.5 times more likely to pay 
bribes than the rich. In fact, according to empirical evidence by Kaufmann et al. (2008) in Peru, the 
authors show that compared to rich households, low income households pay a considerable share of 
their income as bribe to access public services up to the point of discouragement. Thus ‘bribery appears 
to penalize twice poorer users, both acting as a regressive tax and as a discriminating mechanism for 
access to basic services’ (p.2).  
 
2.2.3 Individuals with social networks: The social organization argument 
 
While the economist and the social inequality approaches emphasize individual’s monetary ability, 
the social organization argument postulate that the likelihood of paying bribes hinges on the depth of 
an individual’s social capital and inclusion (Arrow, 1972). Grounded on the concept of reciprocity, 
social networks are perceived as informal channels which individuals, both rich and poor, capitalize 
on to bypass bureaucratic procedures and access public services. This situation is argued to be 
pervasive in African countries where institutional rules are subject to discretionary interpretation by 
both bureaucrats and politicians. According to a classical study by Putnam (1993), societies with high 
social capital, in terms of trust and norms of civic cooperation, experience quality public service 
provision due to social and informal restrictions to bureaucratic opportunisms. In such societies, 
bribery extortions are limited. As argued by Knack and Keefer (1997, p.1254), ‘cooperative norms act 
as constraints on narrow self-interest, leading individuals to contribute to the provision of public 
goods of various kinds, and internal and external sanctions (such as guilt and shame) associated with 
norms alter the costs and benefits of defecting’ and engaging in bribery. Empirical evidence by 
Putnam (1993) points out to the role of social capital in explaining differences in effective public 
service provision across regional governments. 
 
A key aspect emphasized by Uribe (2014) and Smart (2008, p.411) and also integrated in the 
empirical analysis relates to the nature of social capital, where a distinction is made between social 
and political networks. For instance, Olson (1982) argues that social capital, embedded in community 
participation and religious groups reduces the likelihood of corruption by solving collective action 
problem and enhancing information flow on bureaucratic procedures and official user prices for 
public services. This in turn increases political participation of individuals which enable them to 
sanction corrupt officials through democratic processes, and the formation of civil society movements 
which provide checks and balances on bureaucrat’s performance. Such organizations enhance 
transparency and accountability and thus mitigate corruptive behaviour. 
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On the other hand, political networks are associated with increased propensity to promote self-interest 
motives as opportunistic individuals can interact with well-connected politicians to influence 
bureaucratic decisions. Grounded in the works of Portes (1998) and North et al. (2009), political 
contacts are associated with limited access order, as personal relationships form the basis for social 
interaction. As a result, political networks are perceived as special interest groups whose preferences 
are misaligned with institutional and social norms. The adverse effect of political networks is 
exacerbated when politicians have influence on government bureaucrats. Kaufmann and Wei (2000) 
show that in most African countries, politicians can sanction bureaucrats by transferring them to 
remote locations or impeding their career advancement, making them vulnerable to capture. Even 
worse, Arrow (1972) argues that political networks act as mechanisms which facilitate clientistic and 
patronage relationships. As a result, bribery is anticipated to be high for individuals affiliated with 
local political networks and outfits. 
 
2.2.4 Individuals with low levels of trust: The behavioural argument 
 
Unlike the preceding arguments, this school of thought views corruption through the len of 
behavioural science, attributing it to cultural and psychological aspects driven by self-fulfilment 
attitudes of individuals (de Sardan, 1999). The extent to which individuals engage in bribery is purely 
normative and significantly influenced by the perception that everyone else is corrupt and 
untrustworthy. In an institutional setting where public services are rendered in an honest manner, all 
agents internalize the costs of corruption and thus refrain from it (Peiffer and Rose, 2014). However, 
the contrary is true, and in African countries where bribery is rampant and anti-corruption measures 
are weak, bribery becomes a logical option, as the ‘short-term costs of being honest are comparatively 
very high’ and individual’s reason in a manner reflecting ‘well, if everybody seems corrupt, why 
shouldn’t I be corrupt?’ (Persson et al, 2013, p.457). Theoretical models in behavioural science show 
that there exist multiple equilibria and the prevalence of corruption depends on the aggregate level of 
bribery in the society (Lambsdorff, 2012). When bribery is anticipated to be high, the probability of 
detection declines while that of encountering corrupt individuals and bureaucrats increases and as a 
result, this perpetuates bribe payments in exchange of public services (Serra and Ryvkin, 2012, 
Bardhan, 2006). 
 
Persson et al. (2013) present a behavioural model in terms of an assurance game and then demonstrate 
its validity in the context of Kenya and Uganda. The model assumes that there are two agents, an 
individual and the society, where each individual can engage or refrain from bribery while 
encountering government bureaucrats. The authors show that the first best option is when all 
individuals act in an honest manner, yielding a pareto-efficient outcome where everyone is better off 
as public services are optimally provided. However, if one individual perceives that at least one 
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member of the society is corrupt, not engaging in bribery turns out to be an irrational strategy, leaving 
one worse off. This in turn generates a societal norm and culture of bribery, culminating into ‘sub-
optimal corruption equilibrium’. Therefore, the burden of bribery is conditional on an individual’s 
perception and trust in other individuals and bureaucrats in the society.  
3. Conceptual Framework 
 
The analysis of the preceding four arguments highlights the inadequacy of a uni-dimensional 
approach in analysing the factors associated with the burden of bribery. To yield a nuanced and 
analytical framework, this section develops a simple conceptual framework of political agency 
following the seminal work of Rose-Ackerman (1975) and Hirschman (1970). The model then forms 
the basis for the ensuing econometric specification.  
 
In this political agency model, it is assumed that bureaucrats and individuals engage in a two-level 
game in which the bureaucrat has monopoly on the provision of public services. Given this monopoly 
and discretionary power, the bureaucrat initiates the first move, and decides whether to demand for a 
bribe or not. If the bureaucrat abstains from bribery, and acts in an honest manner, then public 
services are rendered without shirking and in accordance with institutional rules. If the bureaucrat 
inclines for a bribe, the official can out rightly demand for it or prompt the client to offer. This leads 
to the second level of the game where the client decides whether to offer a bribe or not. If the client 
declines, then the bureaucrat shirks, and the individual internalises the costs by not receiving the 
service or experiencing delays. If the client offers a bribe, then the bureaucrat commits to offering the 
service.  
 
In line with the principal-agent model, it is conjectured that bribery occurs only if it is mutually 
beneficial to both agents. An individual pays a bribe if the utility derived from accessing the public 
service U2 is greater than the utility obtained from not accessing it U1. On the other hand, a bureaucrat 
engages in bribery if the monetary and non-monetary benefits of the bribe are greater than the effort 
used to circumvent institutional rules as well as the sanctions faced if found shirking or demanding for 
a bribe.  
 
Let w be the wage of the bureaucrat, b is the amount of bribe, E is the effort induced in circumventing 
institutional rules, p is the probability of being caught and S be sanctions imposed if caught. Then a 
rational bureaucrat will engage in bribery if (w + b) (1-p) > pS + E. A bureaucrat thus aims to 
maximize current and future rents denoted by the utility function  
 
U
B
 (r) = u(w) + u(b) + p (w, b ἀ) ∂Vp     Equation (A) 
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which depends positively on current wages (w), bribes received (b), as well as the function p (w, b ἀ) 
which represents the probability of holding a public office, ∂Vp captures the expected future utility 
and  ἀ denotes any accountability mechanisms which constraints the bureaucrat from engaging in 
corruption.  
 
However, according to the theoretical propositions by Rose-Ackerman (1978), Olson (1982) and 
Putnam (1993), a key attribute affecting the parameter b relates to individual’s economic, social and 
political capital. Bribes are mostly paid in monetary and non-monetary terms, and are therefore 
depend on the economic status of an individual, where the rich are a priori anticipated to engage in 
bribery. Individuals can also result to political contacts such as member of parliaments or local 
councillors or they can rely on social networks such as community groups and associations which 
might facilitate access to public services. 
 
In addition, a key attribute affecting ἀ relates to the nature of the public service in terms of the degree 
of market failure and availability of voice and exit options. Hirschman (1970) as well as Paul (1992) 
classify public services into two categories. The first category includes public services which are only 
rendered by bureaucrats (natural monopolies) such as the issuance of permits or utilities such as water 
and electricity. For these services, bureaucrats have an incentive to demand bribes from both the rich 
and the poor due to the absence of alternative suppliers, implying that exit is not a feasible tool for 
accountability. The second category relates to services such as health and education, which exhibit 
exit options, in the sense that these services are also rendered by private actors, though at a higher cost 
but better quality. This implies that rich individuals have the possibility to bow out of public services 
when the cost of bribery is higher than the cost of exit. On the other hand, if the cost of bribery is 
lower than the cost of exit, individuals would prefer to bribe to attain utility U2. Voice and exit 
options thus modify the participation constraint and individuals with higher income are more likely to 
exit public services such as health and education while the poor bear the burden of bribery. 
 
In light of this proposition, the bureaucrat’s utility function modifies to  
 
U
B
 (r) = u(w) + u(b, D ) + p (w, b ἀ E) ∂Vp        Equation (B) 
 
where it now depends on an additional factor D which denotes economic, social and political factors 
as well as E which denotes the cost associated with voice and exit options. Introducing the realistic 
possibility of exit options significantly changes the model’s implication as it relaxes the monopoly 
assumption. This implies that both D and E act as a threshold which determines individual’s 
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willingness to bribe.  In light of these additional factors, the conceptual framework advances the 
following testable hypotheses; 
 
I. The likelihood of paying bribes to access public services is borne by poor individuals and 
depends on the type of public service; 
 
II. The likelihood of paying bribes decreases for individuals with social networks; 
 
III. The likelihood of paying bribes increases for individuals with political networks; 
 
IV. Strong accountability mechanisms reduce the incidence of bribery. 
4. Empirical Methodology 
4.1 Data 
The data used to test the above hypotheses is obtained from the 5
th
 round of the Afro-barometer 
survey, a cross sectional individual-level survey on the quality of democracy and governance in 
Kenya. The survey was conducted between November 2011 and November 2012 using a standard 
questionnaire translated into 7 different languages (English, Kiswahili, Kikuyu, Luo, Kamba, Kalenjin 
and Luhya) by trained enumerators from the University of Nairobi. The unit of observation and 
analysis is the individual and survey respondents are restricted to those above 18 years old. The 
sample consists of 2400 individuals located in 44
2
 local government counties, thus being a nationally 
representative survey. However, due to missing values, the sample slightly reduces to 2305 
individuals. The sampling frame is based on the 2009 National Population and Housing Census 
conducted by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics while the sample design is a ‘random, clustered, 
stratified, multistage area probability sample’ (Carter, 2012, p. 2). The data is weighted to take into 
account individual selection probabilities. The contact rate was 96.9 percent while the response rate 
was 73.4 percent, resulting in a minimal refusal rate of 9.1 percent.  
 
The survey contains detailed responses on individual’s social-economic, demographic and political 
characteristics, information on corruption perception in the country’s main institutions and whether an 
individual paid a bribe to access public services such as permits (driving licence and identity cards), 
health, education, security and connection to utilities (water). The dataset also includes information on 
whether individuals sought assistance from a politician, local government councillor or a member of 
parliament in the previous year to ease the process of obtaining any public services. Finally, the 
survey contains responses on affiliation of individuals to different social and political movements 
                                                          
2
 There are 47 counties in total, and the 3 counties excluded include Mandera, Garissa and Turkana. 
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such as religious or voluntary/community groups. The definitions of the main variables used in the 
empirical model are summarized in Table A1. 
  
4.2 Empirical Model 
 
In order to examine who bears the burden of bribery, the baseline specification which estimates the 
probability of an individual paying a bribe conditional on prevailing economic, social and political 
factors is denoted by  
ijiijjijjijjijjijjij XBPSZy   543210    
 
Equation (1) 
 
where the dependent variable iy  denotes the bribe index which equals 1 if an individual i paid a bribe 
to access a public service j and 0 otherwise. The vector of independent variables includes Zi which 
captures an individual’s economic status (an index of poverty), Si represents an individual’s social 
capital (a binary variable which indicates membership in religious association), Pi represents an 
individual’s political capital (a binary variable which represents contact with local councillor, political 
party, member of parliament or government agency) and Bi captures an individual’s cognitive effect (a 
binary variable which represents an individual’s level of trust regarding the corruptive behaviour of 
others). In order to avoid results driven by omitted variable bias, vector Xi includes a number of 
individual-level controls (age, education, gender, employment status and geographical location) which 
may affect an individual’s poverty status as well as the likelihood to pay a bribe. To ease presentation, 
the control variables are only reported for the main results in Table 2. The model also includes local 
county fixed effects i  to control for time invariant factors (such as ethnicity, historical factors) and 
i  is the error term.  
 
The main coefficient of interest is denoted by 1  and describes the relationship between an 
individual’s poverty level and the probability of paying a bribe. Based on the conceptual framework 
presented in section 3, the coefficient of 1  is expected to be positive, implying that poor individuals 
are more likely to face bureaucratic corruption in exchange of public service due to costly exit option. 
The proxy for social capital – membership in a religious group - is expected to have a negative sign (
2 < 0) as social networks deter bribe payments by solving collective action problems while the 
coefficient of political capital- contact with a public official or being a member of a voluntary 
association- is anticipated to portray a positive sign ( 3 > 0) as political networks are associated with 
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special interest groups and elite capture. Finally, the coefficient of β4 is expected to be negative (β4 < 
0) as high levels of trust in a society decrease the likelihood of an individual engaging in bureaucratic 
corruption.  
 
Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, the econometric technique adopted to estimate 
Equation 1 consists of a binary logistic regression model (Wooldridge, 2002). This ensures that, 
unlike linear probability models (LPM), the predicted probabilities are not greater than 1 or less than 
zero i.e. (0 ≤ probability ≥ 1). This transforms Equation 1 to  
 
 log (
𝜋𝑖
1−𝜋𝑖
) = ijiijjijjijjijjijj XBPSZ   543210       
 
Equation (2) 
 
where 𝜋𝑖= P (Yi = 1) and 1 − 𝜋𝑖= P (Yi = 0)  and the empirical estimates can be interpreted both as 
odds ratios or as probabilities. 
 
 
Construction of the poverty index 
 
One of the key limitations of the Afro-barometer dataset is that it does not contain any direct measure 
of the respondent’s economic status (poverty levels). In order to address this concern, a novel 
approach is adopted where a poverty index is constructed as a proxy. It is derived from a series of 
questions which ask respondents how frequent they have been deprived of basic household amenities 
in the previous year. On a scale from zero to four, (0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 
3=Many times, 4=Always) respondents are asked ‘Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or 
anyone in your family gone without: (1) enough food (2) enough clean water for home use (3) enough 
without medical care (4) enough fuel to cook your food and (5) without a cash income’ Carter (2012, 
p.10-11). The responses to these five questions are then aggregated into a single index, using equal 
weights. Figure 1 displays the distribution of the index, with higher values implying that individuals 
are poor and lack basic household necessities while lower values imply individuals are rich and well-
off. As illustrated by the pairwise correlation in Table A2, all the five components of the index are 
positive and significantly correlated at the 5 percent level.  
 
The reliance on this index is superior to conventional income measures as it encompasses a multi-
dimensional assessment of poverty and deprivation, a standard approach proposed in the poverty 
literature by Sen (1976). This approach diverts from the consumption index used by Hunt and Laszlo 
(2012) in their study of Uganda and Peru, as consumption may be a proxy for individual’s choices 
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rather than their poverty levels. It also improves on the income measures used by Hunt (2007) as 
respondents are more likely to underestimate their income and wealth in survey data.   
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics on the perception of bribery in the country’s main institutions is depicted in 
Table A3. The data reveals that bribery is perceived to be high and prevalent, especially in institutions 
at the county level. At least 90% of the respondents claim that local government councillors, 
bureaucrats, members of parliament and the police are corrupt. Among these, 31% claim that the 
entire police force is corrupt, while this magnitude is 15.6% for councillors and 13% for members of 
parliament, perhaps reflecting the degree of discretionary powers exercised by such officials or due to 
prior experience. Less than 10% of the respondents perceive corruption to be non-existence, a finding 
consistent with TI (2015). Table A4 presents the distribution of bribe payments, disaggregated by 
poverty quintile, where the 1
st
 quintile represents the poorest individuals while the 5
th
 quintile 
represents the richest. The results show that while the burden of bribery is distributed across all 
groups, a substantial number of individuals who paid bribes fall in the middle of the distribution. 
Thus, bribery seems to be a major problem affecting both rich and poor individuals. Out of 2305 
respondents, 56.2% paid a bribe to access a permit while 54.1% paid a bribe to avoid problems with 
the police. According to the Paul (1992), these reflect the type of public services which the 
bureaucrats possess monopoly in their provision and thus more likely to exhibit higher bribery rates.  
 
Table A5 reports the frequency of bribe payments across all the public services. The results show that 
the frequency of bribery is high for police and permits, services which are only provided by 
bureaucrats. For instance, 6.8 % of the respondents pay bribes regularly when seeking permits while 
20.3% of the respondents have at least paid a bribe once or twice. The pairwise correlation matrix in 
Table A6 shows that paying bribes is positively and significantly correlated with an individual’s 
poverty level as well as social and political capital. Individuals who have contacted politicians are 
more likely to pay bribes while old respondents, especially females, are associated with lower 
propensity to bribe, given their limited contacts with bureaucrats or demand for public services. 
5.2 Estimating the determinants of paying bribes 
Tables 1-2 report the determinants of bribe payment in exchange for public services across the 44 
local counties. As a starting point, Table 1 presents the results of a linear probability model (LPM) 
corresponding to the baseline specification. In column (1), the binary dependent variable equals 1 if 
an individual paid a bribe to access at least one type of public service and zero otherwise, while in 
columns (2) through (6), the dependent variable is disaggregated in order to examine whether the 
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determinants of bribery vary across different types of public services. County fixed effects are 
incorporated in all the specifications in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity. In all the 
columns, the results suggest that the impact of poverty on the likelihood of paying a bribe is positive 
and statistically significant at the conventional levels. This result indicates that poor individuals, as 
measured by the poverty index, are more likely to pay bribes to bureaucrats. Holding other factors 
constant, a 1 unit increase in the poverty index is associated with an increase in the likelihood of 
paying a bribe by 0.8% to 1.9%. The disaggregated results show that the highest effect is for health 
(1.9%) - services which the rich have an exit option to private providers whose services cost, as well 
as quality, is higher than in the public sector. This finding provides suggestive evidence that point out 
to a poverty-bribery trap, where the poor end up bearing the burden of bribery while the rich opt out 
of public services.  
 
Table 1: Linear Probability Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Bribe 
paid 
Bribe index Permits Water Health Police Education 
 
Poverty 
 
0.012
***
 
 
0.013
***
 
 
0.010
**
 
 
0.019
***
 
 
0.011
***
 
 
0.008
* 
 (3.71) (3.59) (2.63) (5.29) (2.83) (1.93) 
       
Religious group member -0.024
***
 -0.008 -0.013 0.001 -0.035
***
 -0.026
***
 
 (-2.65) (-0.68) (-1.25) (0.11) (-4.41) (-2.91) 
Voluntary group member 0.019
* 
0.015 0.038
***
 0.022
**
 0.038
***
 0.022
* 
 (1.69) (1.34) (3.50) (2.02) (2.98) (1.90) 
       
Contact with local councilor  0.036
**
 0.061
***
 0.029 0.032
* 
0.034
**
 0.011 
 (2.06) (3.45) (1.61) (1.72) (2.33) (0.62) 
Contact with MP 0.007 0.012 0.034
* 
0.050
**
 0.016 0.041
**
 
 (0.46) (0.76) (1.72) (2.45) (0.90) (2.23) 
Contact with gov. agency 0.006 -0.002 -0.003 -0.033
**
 -0.014 -0.038
***
 
 (0.43) (-0.13) (-0.16) (-2.09) (-1.01) (-2.66) 
Contact with political party -0.005 0.001 -0.017 -0.017 0.034
**
 0.0003 
 (-0.38) (0.05) (-0.95) (-0.93) (2.45) (0.02) 
       
Cognitive effect (trust)  -0.008 -0.006 -0.0002 -0.009 -0.005 -0.005 
 (-1.13) (-1.01) (-0.03) (-1.49) (-0.54) (-0.80) 
       
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 
R
2 
F statistic 
2305 
0.039 
11.15 
2305 
0.039 
5.43 
2305 
0.030 
4.52 
2305 
0.046 
4.43 
2305 
0.040 
9.93 
2305 
0.028 
6.67 
t statistic in parentheses. Robust standard errors used. Significance at 
*
 10%; 
**
 5%; 
***
 1%. Control 
variables as defined in the baseline model. 
 
 
Table 2 reports the main findings which are based on a binary logistic regression. The estimates, 
which are significant at the 5 percent level, underscore poverty as an important determinant of paying 
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bribes in exchange for public services. This result is robust across the different public services, even 
after controlling for individual-level characteristics and county fixed effects. In column (1), the 
coefficient of poverty implies that a 1 unit increase in poverty multiplies the odds of paying a bribe by 
a factor of exp (0.067) = 1.069. In other words, with all other factors held constant, the probability for 
a poor individual to pay a bribe increases by 6.9%. This result is in line with the theoretical claims by 
Peiffer and Rose, (2014) that bribery has adverse distributional consequences and does not constitute 
an elite problem in most African countries. Consistent with the LPM results, the likelihood of paying 
a bribe also depends on the type of public service. Poor individuals in pursuit of health services are 
more likely to face bureaucratic corruption (the odds increase by 8.5%) while the odds of those 
seeking public education increase by 3.6%. This could perhaps reflect the possibility that the rich use 
the exit option and opt out of public health or education, while the poor who continue to depend on 
such services bear the cost of bribery. In sum, the estimates from both LPM and logistic regression are 
consistent with the pairwise correlations in Table A6 and provide consistent evidence to support 
hypothesis 1: compared to rich individuals, the poor are more likely to pay bribes to bureaucrats in 
exchange for public services. 
 
The empirical results in Tables 1-2 also underpin social capital and informal networks as key 
determinants of bribe payment. In line with the social network argument, the results show that the 
effect of social network on bribery systematically differs from that of political networks. The 
estimates show that individuals who are affiliated to a religious group are less likely to bear the 
burden of bribery and according to column (1) in Table 2, holding other factors constant, being a 
member of a religious group is associated with an 11.8% [1- exp (-0.126)] decrease in the probability 
of paying a bribe. This finding, which is significant at the 1% level, supports the theoretical 
proposition by North et al. (2009) that open access to social organizations is vital in providing third 
party enforcement on officials in the public sector. Consistent with hypothesis 2, the results support 
the notion that social networks reduce the incidence of bribery. 
 
By contrast, membership in a voluntary organization such as business group increases the chances of 
paying a bribe. In columns (3) through (6) of Table 2, the results show that, consistent with the logic 
by Olson (1982), the odds of individuals affiliated to voluntary organization paying a bribe are high: 
17.23% for water, 10.30% for health , 17.12% for police and 10.08% for education. As for the effect 
of political contact on the likelihood of bribe payment, the results in Table 1-2 suggest a positive and 
statistically significant effect, especially for individuals who contact a member of parliament or a 
local councillor. The magnitude of the coefficients are however larger in the logistic model and 
significant across the different public services. In column (1) of Table 2, the results show that 
contacting a local councillor in order to access a public service multiplies the odds of paying a bribe 
by exp (0.212) = 23.6%. This magnitude turns out to be the highest for those seeking permits (30.7%) 
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and police services (16.1%). As argued by Tanzi (1995), in weak states, localization of public service 
may ‘promote personalism and reduce professionalism and arm’s length relationships as bureaucrats 
value individual citizens needs and disregard public interests’ (Shah, 2006. p. 17). This finding seems 
to be in line with a case study by Khaunya et al. (2015), where the authors find evidence of collusion 
between local politicians, bureaucrats and elites due to increased cohesiveness at the county level. In 
line with hypothesis 3, this finding may be interpreted as evidence that political capital increases the 
likelihood of bribe payment. 
 
Finally, the results do not provide evidence that cognitive factors influence the probability of bribe 
payment. In Tables 1-2, the proxy for cognitive bias is not significant at any conventional level, 
although it consistently retains a negative sign. This finding complements recent studies by Campbell 
and Goritz (2013) who argue that social norms and ideologies are endogenous and constantly change 
over time. This could partly explain the low explanatory power of cognitive factors as determinants of 
bribery across the different public services. 
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Table 2: Binary Logistic Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Bribe 
paid 
Bribe index Permits Water Health Police Education 
       
Poverty 0.067
***
 0.054
***
 0.044
***
 0.082
***
 0.044
***
 0.035
**
 
 (3.58) (3.54) (2.63) (5.33) (2.80) (2.03) 
       
Religious group member -0.126
***
 -0.033 -0.054 0.004 -0.151
***
 -0.115
***
 
 (-2.67) (-0.72) (-1.24) (0.09) (-4.33) (-2.85) 
Voluntary group member 0.100 0.063 0.159
***
 0.098
**
 0.158
***
 0.096
* 
 (1.60) (1.31) (3.47) (2.04) (2.87) (1.95) 
       
Contact with local councilor 0.212
* 
0.268
***
 0.124 0.141
* 
0.149
**
 0.052 
 (1.95) (3.33) (1.62) (1.77) (2.28) (0.68) 
Contact with MP 0.066 0.073 0.146
* 
0.224
**
 0.081 0.182
**
 
 (0.62) (0.92) (1.72) (2.49) (1.00) (2.26) 
Contact with gov. agency 0.036 -0.008 -0.012 -0.155
**
 -0.061 -0.181
**
 
 (0.44) (-0.13) (-0.19) (-1.99) (-1.01) (-2.50) 
Contact with political party -0.027 0.005 -0.071 -0.075 0.170
**
 0.010 
 (-0.32) (0.07) (-0.95) (-0.91) (2.29) (0.12) 
       
Cognitive effect(trust) -0.039 -0.024 -0.001 -0.040 -0.018 -0.020 
 (-1.09) (-0.96) (-0.04) (-1.48) (-0.51) (-0.75) 
       
Employment 0.105
* 
0.082 -0.070 0.015 0.063
* 
-0.144
***
 
 (1.88) (1.30) (-1.56) (0.40) (1.67) (-4.00) 
Education 0.023 -0.008 -0.002 -0.0001 0.009 0.025 
 (1.02) (-0.91) (-0.24) (-0.01) (0.78) (1.47) 
Religion -0.00004 -0.00005
**
 -0.0001
* 
-0.00003 -0.00002 -0.00004
* 
 (-1.36) (-1.98) (-1.66) (-1.47) (-0.77) (-1.88) 
Gender -0.164
* 
-0.056 0.061 0.095 -0.252
**
 -0.040 
 (-1.68) (-0.66) (0.91) (1.13) (-2.60) (-0.51) 
Age -0.002
***
 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
* 
-0.003 
 (-2.72) (-1.50) (-1.01) (-1.05) (-1.81) (-1.74) 
Urban -0.044 0.119 0.026 -0.040 0.027 -0.196
**
 
 (-0.39) (0.99) (0.28) (-0.37) (0.28) (-2.21) 
       
Constant 0.801
**
 -0.355 -0.825
***
 -1.096
***
 0.113 -0.020 
 (2.20) (-1.10) (-3.59) (-4.75) (0.38) (-0.09) 
N 
Pseudo R
2
 
2305 
0.035 
2305 
0.030 
2305 
0.023 
2305 
0.035 
2305 
0.030 
2305 
0.022 
z statistic in parentheses. Robust standard errors used. Significant at 
*
 10%; 
**
 5%; 
***
 1% 
 
5.3 Estimating the determinants of the frequency of bribe payments 
 
Table 3 investigates the determinants of the frequency of bribe payments in exchange for public 
services. Given that the dependent variable has a natural ordering (0=Never, 1=Once or twice, 2=A 
few times, 3=Often), the baseline specification is estimated using an ordinal logistic regression 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). This transforms Equation 1 to 
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(
𝑃(𝑌𝑖≤𝑗)
𝑃(𝑌𝑖>𝑗)
) =log (
𝛾𝑖
𝑗
1−𝛾𝑖
𝑗) = )( 54321
)(
ijiijjijjijjijjijj
j XBPSZ    
 
         
Equation (3) 
 
 
where the dependent variable has 4 ordered categories denoted by j = 1, …4, 
)( j  are the 3 thresholds 
between each category and probabilities 𝛾𝑖
𝑗
= P (Yi ≤ j). 
 
Consistent with the previous findings, not only are the poor more likely to pay bribes, but they make 
such payments more frequently than the rich and well-off. Across the different public services, the 
coefficient of poverty turns out to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, even after 
the inclusion of several control variables and local county fixed effects. In column (1) of Table 3, the 
odds of paying bribes for poor individuals is in exchange for permits is multiplied by a factor of exp 
(0.105) = 1.1107. This is equivalent to stating that, controlling for the other explanatory variables, a 1 
unit increase in the poverty index is associated with an 11.07% increase in the odds of giving a 
response that indicate higher frequency in paying bribes in exchange for permits. The empirical 
results further show that despite an even distribution of the frequency of bribe payment across the 
different public services, the magnitude is stronger for health services (15.8%), water (15.1%) and 
education (12.2%). These results are consistent with the descriptive statistics in Table A5 and 
correspond to Hunt’s (2007) assertion that ‘corruption hits people when they are down’. In sum, the 
findings lend support to the hypothesis that not only does the burden of bribery disproportionally fall 
on the poor, but it affects public services such as health and education which exhibit costly exit 
options for poor individuals. 
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Table 3: Ordinal Logistic Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: Bribe paid Permits Water Health Police Education 
      
Poverty 0.105
***
 0.141
***
 0.147
***
 0.059
***
 0.115
***
 
 (5.99) (7.12) (10.83) (4.05) (7.12) 
      
Religious group member -0.007 -0.103
* 
-0.018 -0.114
***
 0.001 
 (-0.15) (-1.82) (-0.33) (-2.65) (0.02) 
Voluntary group member 0.024 0.188
***
 0.096
**
 0.154
***
 0.118
**
 
 (0.52) (4.52) (2.17) (2.95) (2.45) 
      
Contact with local councilor 0.199
***
 0.060 0.125 0.056 0.125 
 (3.09) (0.70) (1.63) (0.87) (1.35) 
Contact with MP 0.021 0.121 0.197
**
 -0.050 0.128 
 (0.28) (1.43) (2.28) (-0.59) (1.45) 
Contact with gov. agency -0.047 -0.172
* 
-0.123 0.010 -0.180
* 
 (-0.74) (-1.75) (-1.46) (0.22) (-1.88) 
Contact with political party 0.035 0.130 -0.078 0.240
**
 0.016 
 (0.46) (1.25) (-0.90) (2.52) (0.18) 
      
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 
Pseudo R
2
 
2305 
0.041 
2305 
0.055 
2305 
0.052 
2305 
0.042 
2305 
0.038 
z statistic in parentheses. Robust standard errors used. Significant at 
*
 10%; 
**
 5%; 
***
 1%.  
 
5.4 Estimating the role of accountability mechanisms 
In line with the political agency model elaborated in the conceptual framework, this section examines 
how countervailing accountability mechanisms such as voice and exit can cushion the poor from 
bribery by altering bureaucrat’s opportunistic behaviour and increasing the levels of political 
awareness. To analyse this link, an interaction term between proxies for accountability and poverty 
are introduced into the baseline specification which is estimated using a binary logistic model. Due to 
data availability, the analysis is only restricted to the use of voice as an instrument for enforcing 
accountability. Following Alam (1995), the strength of civil society movements and a free and 
independent media are used as proxies for voice. This transforms Equation 1 to  
 
Log (
𝜋𝑖
1−𝜋𝑖
) = iii AlityAccountabiPovertylityAccountabiPoverty   4321 ))((       
 
Equation (4) 
 
where 𝜋𝑖= P (Yi = 1) and 1 − 𝜋𝑖= P (Yi = 0) and accountability is a dummy variable representing 
 
          civil society = {
1, if its strong
0, otherwise
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and 
media = {
1, if its strong
0, otherwise
 
 
and the intercept term as well as all variables excluded from the interaction are denoted by A. By 
taking derivatives, the effect of poverty on bribe payment is given by )(31 lityAccountabi  , 
where it is conditional on the strength of existing accountability mechanisms. Table 4 reports the 
results corresponding to civil society movements, and the interaction term is negative and statistically 
significant across most specifications. The empirical estimates in column (1) show that the effect of 
poverty on bribe payment is 0.104-0.015*(civil society). Intuitively, this implies that when the civil 
society is weak (civil society = 0), the odds of a poor individual paying a bribe in exchange for a 
public service is exp (0.104) = 1.1096, that is it increases by 10.96%. However, in counties with 
strong civil societies which hold local officials and bureaucrat accountable (civil society = 1), the 
likelihood of bribe payment declines significantly as the odds of a poor individual paying a bribe is 
exp (0.104-0.015) = exp (0.089) = 1.093. In other words, the probability is 9.3% which is lower 
compared to weak civil societies. Table A7 further confirms the effectiveness of countervailing 
strategies when media is taken as a proxy for accountability, a result which is consistent with studies 
such as those of Kneller et al. (2007) and Reinikka and Svensson (2004). These findings support 
hypothesis 4 that accountability mechanism based on third party enforcement can play a key role in 
mitigating bureaucratic corruption by holding local officials accountable and fostering transparency in 
bureaucratic procedures. 
 
Table 4: Binary Logit Regression: Role of Civil Society Movements 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Bribe index Permits Water Health Police Education 
       
Poverty 0.104
***
 0.092
***
 0.101
***
 0.103
***
 0.082
***
 0.066
**
 
 (5.27) (5.21) (5.36) (5.12) (4.55) (2.87) 
       
Civil society 0.052 0.064
* 
0.087
**
 0.012 0.066
* 
0.045 
 (1.27) (1.86) (2.62) (0.34) (1.88) (1.20) 
       
Poverty * Civil society -0.015
***
 -0.012
***
 -0.017
***
 -0.007 -0.013
***
 -0.011
**
 
 (-2.68) (-2.88) (-4.16) (-1.41) (-3.18) (-2.11) 
       
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 
Pseudo R
2 
2300 
0.016 
2300 
0.013 
2300 
0.015 
2300 
0.024 
2300 
0.010 
2300 
0.010 
z statistic in parentheses. Robust standard errors used. Significant at 
*
 10%; 
**
 5%; 
***
 1%.  
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6. Robustness 
 
To ensure the reliability and accuracy of the main findings, three potential concerns are addressed. 
The first one relates to differences in the interpretation of bribery across respondents from different 
cultures in the different counties. However, such effect can be argued to be minimal given that the 
survey was conducted in local languages. The second concern appertains to social desirability bias as 
respondents may inaccurately misreport (underestimate or overestimate) the incidence of bribery due 
to fear of social and legal litigations (Sequeira, 2012). In order to address the downward social 
desirability bias, an innovative approach is adopted where the main resulted in Tables 2-3 are re-
estimated after excluding the proportion of respondents who thought that the survey was being 
conducted or financed by the central government. Despite the reduction of the sample size by 48%, 
the results reported in Table A8-A9 reveal that the main findings related to the four hypotheses are 
robust.  
 
The final concern relates to the choice of the econometric technique. Amongst the respondents who 
did not pay a bribe, some of them may have never been asked to pay by bureaucrats. This implies that 
if the poor frequently pay bribes, the coefficient of poverty will be overestimated. To address this, a 
two-stage econometric model is estimated (hurdle model) which takes into account zero and positive 
counts and fits a model to the positive counts only. Given the over-dispersion in bribe payments (a 
large number of zero’s in the dependent variable) as depicted in figure 2, the main results (Table 2) 
are replicated using a negative binominal model. The estimates are reported in Table A10. As 
anticipated, poverty, – as well as the proxies for social and political capital- retain the expected signs 
and remain significant at the conventional levels. In summary, the robustness results show that the 
results are insensitive to different specifications and econometric assumptions. 
7. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 
Existing empirics in the corruption literature continue to advance contradictory propositions on how 
to design sound anti-corruption reforms aimed at addressing bureaucratic corruption. This paper 
argues that this arises due to the failure to identify the distributional impact of bribe payments and 
precisely who bears the burden of bribery. In reconciling previous studies, this paper presents a 
unified analytical framework which simultaneously examines how the incidence of bribery in public 
service delivery varies with an individual’s economic, social and political factors. It then investigates 
what forms of accountability mechanisms are effective in mitigating bureaucratic opportunism 
behaviour.  
 
Using an individual-level and experience-based survey conducted across local counties in Kenya, and 
implementing a series of logistical regression analysis, several key findings emerge. First, the burden 
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of bribery disproportionally falls on the poor, who face costly exit options to alternative supplies. 
Second, the poor pay bribes more frequent than the rich, an aspect which reinforces the poverty-
bribery trap. Third, the likelihood of paying bribes differs across public services, with the effects 
being stronger for health and education - services which the rich have the potential to exit and seek 
from the private sector. Fourth, membership to social organizations reduces bribery while political 
organizations increase the propensity to bribe. Finally, the results offer strong evidence in support of 
strong civil societies and media as effective instruments which can deter bureaucratic corruption.  
 
These findings have important policy implications. First, they highlight the need to align anti-
corruption reforms with poverty reduction strategies, an aspect lacking in the localization initiative in 
Kenya. Empowering the poor, in terms of boosting income opportunities may play a key role in 
reducing the incidence of bribery by increasing opportunities to exit to alternative sources which 
provide better quality but expensive services. Second, consistent with the logic by North et al. (2009), 
promoting open access order, especially membership in religious and community association should 
be encouraged as a channel for solving information asymmetry and collective action problems which 
perpetuate corruption. Finally strengthening local countervailing mechanisms such as civil society 
movements and a free media can alter the structure of incentives faced by bureaucrats and local 
politicians, and thus foster downward accountability, and thus equity in accessing public services. 
 
Despite the rigor undertaken in the analysis, several caveats remain. First, the paper is silent on the 
magnitude of bribes. Poor individuals might be more likely to pay bribes, but the amount may be 
lower compared to the rich. While this could be the case, substantiating this claim is not possible as 
the survey data does not contain any information on the actual amount of bribes paid. Second, from 
the survey responses, it is not possible to identify whether individuals drive bribery or react to 
demands from bureaucrats. The third caveat relates to the problem of reverse causality. While the 
poor are prone to pay bribes, individuals who pay bribes might be poorer to begin with and thus 
perpetuate bribery in exchange of public services. However, in the absence of a valid instrument for 
poverty, the analysis abstains from interpreting the empirical estimates in a causal manner. Finally, 
given the trade-off between quantitative and qualitative techniques, the analysis does not fully capture 
the underlying processes and mechanisms which account for variations in public service provision and 
accountability between better and worse performing local counties. While these concerns are fully 
acknowledged and left for future research, the empirical findings offer vital insights on the micro-
level dynamics of bribery in public service delivery across local counties in Kenya. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of poverty index 
 
Source: own calculation from Afro-barometer survey (2011). 
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Figure 2: Distribution of the response variable (disaggregated by each public service) 
 
Source: own calculation from Afro-barometer survey (2011). 
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Table A1: Variable Description 
Variable 
Question number 
in the survey Description
*
 Expected sign 
Bribe Q61A-Q61E 
In the past year, how often, if ever, have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift or do a 
favour to government officials in order to get: water or sanitation services, treatment 
at a local health clinic or hospital, avoid problem with the police or get school 
placement? 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often, 4= no experience 
Dependent variable 
Poverty Q8A-Q8E Poverty index as constructed in section 4 positive 
Religious group member Q25A Are you a member of a religious group? yes= 1; No = 0 negative 
Voluntary group member Q25B Are you a member of a voluntary association? yes= 1; No = 0 positive 
Contact with local councillor  Q30A 
How often have you contacted the local government councillor at some important 
problem to assist? 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often 
positive 
Contact with MP Q30B 
How often have you contacted the local government councillor at some important 
problem to assist? 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often 
positive 
Contact with gov. agency Q30C 
How often have you contacted the local government councillor at some important 
problem to assist? 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often 
positive 
Contact with political party Q30D 
How often have you contacted the local government councillor at some important 
problem to assist? 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often 
positive 
Cognitive effect (trust) Q60C 
How many government officials do you think are involved in corruption? None=0, 
1= at least some of them 
positive 
Employment Q96 Employed = 1; Unemployed = 0 positive 
Education 
 
0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling only, 2=Some primary  ambiguous 
  
schooling, 3=secondary school ,4=post-secondary 
 
Gender Q101 male=1; female =0 ambiguous 
Age Q113 age in years negative 
Urban Q115 urban= 1; rural=0 ambiguous 
Media Q53 
How effective the news media reveals government mistakes and corruption? 1= 
effective, 0=ineffective 
 
Civil society movement Q59 
How effective civil societies reveal government mistakes and corruption? 1= 
effective, 0=ineffective 
 
    
Source: Carter (2012). *Description of the questions are replicated from the questionnaire. 
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Table A2: Pairwise Correlation (components of the poverty index) 
  Fuel Water 
Medical 
care 
Cooking 
fuel 
Cash 
income 
Fuel 1 
    Water 0.461
** 
1 
   Medical care 0.474
**
 0.485
**
 1 
  Cooking fuel 0.409
**
 0.428
**
 0.431
**
 1 
 Cash income 0.408
**
 0.305
**
 0.414
**
 0.323
**
    1 
** 
Significance at 5%.  
Source: own calculation from Afro-barometer survey (2011).  
 
 
Table A3: Distribution of the number of individuals (in %) who perceive different institutions as 
corrupt 
 
all of 
them 
most of 
them 
some of 
them 
none of 
them 
don’t 
know 
Members of parliament 13.1 36.8 41.0 2.3 6.8 
Government officials 12.4 40.1 39.4 1.6 6.4 
Local government councillors 15.6 34.7 41.0 2.9 5.9 
Police 31.0 39.3 23.0 2.4 4.9 
      Source: own calculation from Afro-barometer survey (2011). 
 
Table A4: Distribution of the number of individuals (in %) who paid a bribe, disaggregated by 
quintiles of the poverty index 
            
Number of people 
who 
number of 
respondents 
 
1
st
 2
nd
 3
rd
 4
th
  5
th
 
paid 
bribes 
did not pay 
bribes 
 Permits 11.7 11.76 10.2 13.15 9.5 1296 1009 2305 
Water or sanitation services 8.5 8.8 6.3 10.02 7.2 940 1365 2305 
Treatment at local health clinic 7.3 7.6 6.2 10.4 7.8 905 1400 2305 
Police 12.1 12.1 8.2 12.2 9.5 1247 1058 2305 
Placement in primary school 8.7 8.2 5.6 8.9 6.7 876 1429 2305 
Source: own calculation from Afro-barometer survey (2011).  
Note: The quintiles are constructed using the poverty index as outlined in section 4.  
 
 
Table A5: Distribution of the number of individuals (in %) who paid a bribe, disaggregated by 
frequency of payments 
 
Often 
a few 
times 
once or 
twice 
no experience 
within last past year 
Permits 6.8 11.8 20.3 18 
Water or sanitation services 2.6 7.4 7.6 23.3 
Treatment at local health clinic 4.2 11 12.8 11.8 
Police 8.2 10.8 12.7 22.6 
Placement in primary school 2.4 5.6 9.1 21 
Source: own calculation from Afro-barometer survey (2011).  
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Table A6: Correlation Matrix 
                        
  Bribe 
index 
Poverty
  
Religious 
group 
member 
Voluntary 
group 
member 
Contact 
with local 
councilor 
Contact 
with MP 
Contact 
with 
gov. 
agency 
Contact 
with 
political 
party 
Employ-
ment 
Education  Gender   Age Trust  Urban 
Bribe index 1                     
Poverty 0.10
*** 
1                   
Religious group member -0.03 0.08
***
 1                 
Voluntary group member 0.06
***
 0.10
***
 0.31
***
 1               
Contact with local councilor 0.10
***
 0.08
***
 0.09
***
 0.19
***
 1             
Contact with MP 0.07
***
 0.04
**
 0.06
***
 0.11
***
 0.50
***
  1        
Contact with gov. agency 0.06
***
 0.03 0.06
***
 0.17
***
 0.38
***
  0.36
***
 1       
Contact with political party 0.04
**
 0.04
*
 0.08
**
 0.10
***
 0.38
***
  0.46
***
 0.38
***
 1      
Employment 0.05
**
 -0.16
***
 -0.01 0.06
**
 0.04  0.05
**
 0.04
**
 0.06
***
 1     
Education 0.03 -0.06
***
 -0.03 0.002 0.07
***
  0.14
***
 0.08
***
  0.11
***
 0.10
***
 1    
Gender -0.07
***
 -0.02 0.04
*
 -0.01 -0.15
***
 -0.07
***
 -0.13
***
  -0.12
***
  -0.11
***
 -0.07
***
 1   
Age -0.05
**
 0.08
***
 0.02 -0.01 0.08
**
  0.08
***
  0.07
***
  0.08
***
  -0.03 0.22
***
 0.001 1  
Trust -0.04 0.08
***
 -0.02  0.02 -0.03 -0.04
*
 -0.02  0.001 -0.06
***
 -0.09
***
 0.11
***
 -0.02      1 
Urban  -0.003 0.11
***
 0.08
***
  0.01 0.10
***
 0.08
***
 0.04
**
   0.04
**
 -0.14
***
 -0.07
***
 -0.02 0.04
**
    0.03      1 
              
Significance is denoted by *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05 and * for p<0.1 
Source: Afro-barometer survey (2011).  
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TableA7: Logistic regression: Role of the Media  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Bribe index Permits Water Health Police Education 
       
Poverty 0.110
***
 0.144
***
 0.191
***
 0.174
***
 0.131
***
 0.196
***
 
 (5.72) (5.97) (3.94) (7.42) (6.04) (6.63) 
       
Media  0.115
**
 0.037 0.052 0.032 0.119 0.079 
 (2.11) (0.66) (0.45) (0.45) (1.40) (0.82) 
       
Poverty * Media  -0.017
**
 -0.017
**
 -0.023 -0.009 -0.029
***
 -0.032
***
 
 (-2.37) (-2.09) (-1.42) (-0.95) (-2.78) (-2.82) 
       
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 
Pseudo R
2 
2300 
0.037 
2300 
0.064 
2300 
0.078 
2300 
0.079 
2300 
0.069 
2300 
0.034 
z statistic in parentheses. Robust standard errors used. Significant at 
*
 10%, 
**
 5%, 
***
 1%. 
Source: Afro-barometer survey (2011).  
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Table A8: Robustness results: Logit Regressions – correction for social desirability bias 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Bribe index Permits Water Health Police Education 
       
Poverty 0.072
***
 0.043
***
 0.044
***
 0.062
***
 0.037
**
 0.048
***
 
 (4.30) (2.99) (3.04) (4.21) (2.52) (3.29) 
       
Religious group member -0.144
**
 -0.013 -0.096 -0.038 -0.218
***
 -0.114
** 
 (-2.32) (-0.23) (-1.64) (-0.64) (-3.77) (-1.96) 
Voluntary group member 0.085 0.032 0.120
**
 0.104
* 
0.118
**
 0.058 
 (1.40) (0.59) (2.16) (1.87) (2.13) (1.04) 
       
Contact with local councilor 0.234
***
 0.321
***
 0.126
* 
0.141
* 
0.100 0.006 
 (2.70) (4.23) (1.70) (1.89) (1.36) (0.08) 
Contact with MP -0.010 -0.040 0.060 0.082 -0.042 0.148 
 (-0.08) (-0.39) (0.60) (0.81) (-0.42) (1.47) 
Contact with gov. agency 0.003 -0.033 -0.064 -0.093 -0.035 -0.038 
 (0.03) (-0.47) (-0.89) (-1.26) (-0.50) (-0.52) 
Contact with political party -0.08 -0.029 -0.103 -0.049 0.183
* 
-0.060 
 (-0.75) (-0.29) (-1.02) (-0.49) (1.74) (-0.60) 
       
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 
Pseudo R
2 
1286 
0.036 
1286 
0.026 
1286 
0.016 
1286 
0.020 
1286 
0.031 
1286 
0.016 
z statistic in parentheses. Robust standard errors used. Significant at 
*
 10%; 
**
 5%; 
***
 1% 
Note: The sample size in this table excludes all respondents who perceived that the survey was conducted or 
financed by the central government. It excludes all those who answered central government to the question 
Q100: Who do you think sent us to do this interview? 
Source: Afro-barometer survey (2011).  
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Table A9: Robustness results: Ordered regression - correction for social desirability bias  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Permits Water Health Police Education 
      
Poverty 0.097
***
 0.153
***
 0.142
***
 0.071
***
 0.144
***
 
 (6.54) (7.66) (8.61) (4.59) (7.44) 
      
Religious group member 0.035 -0.163
* 
-0.033 -0.178
***
 -0.031 
 (0.61) (-1.94) (-0.49) (-2.81) (-0.38) 
Voluntary group member 0.033 0.190
**
 0.155
**
 0.164
***
 0.097 
 (0.60) (2.54) (2.46) (2.80) (1.30) 
      
Contact with local councilor 0.304
***
 0.174
* 
0.174
**
 0.110 0.125 
 (4.23) (1.74) (2.10) (1.43) (1.27) 
Contact with MP -0.045 0.059 0.157 -0.072 0.155 
 (-0.44) (0.45) (1.38) (-0.70) (1.19) 
Contact with gov. agency -0.005 -0.157 -0.0615 0.0315 -0.108 
 (-0.07) (-1.45) (-0.74) (0.45) (-1.03) 
Contact with political party -0.0005 0.040 -0.098 0.163
* 
-0.096 
 (-0.01) (0.31) (-0.85) (1.74) (-0.72) 
      
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Threshold 1      
 1.109
***
 2.339
***
 1.729
***
 0.400 2.344
***
 
 (3.40) (5.20) (4.22) (1.20) (5.30) 
Threshold 2      
 2.193
***
 3.016
***
 2.475
***
 1.159
***
 3.189
***
 
 (6.63) (6.62) (5.98) (3.45) (7.10) 
Threshold 3      
 3.396
***
 4.508
***
 3.932
***
 2.157
***
 4.588
***
 
 (9.83) (9.23) (9.09) (6.26) (9.52) 
N 
Pseudo R
2 
1286 
0.046 
1286 
0.072 
1286 
0.055 
1286 
0.058 
1286 
0.051 
z statistic in parentheses. Robust standard errors used. Significant at 
*
 10%; 
**
 5%; 
***
 1% 
Note: The sample size in this table excludes all respondents who perceived that the survey was conducted or 
financed by the central government. It excludes all those who answered central government to the question 
Q100: Who do you think sent us to do this interview? 
Source: Afro-barometer survey (2011).  
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Table A10: Robustness results: Hurdle model - Negative binomial Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Bribe index Permits Water Health Police Education 
       
Poverty 0.016
***
 0.022
***
 0.025
***
 0.047
***
 0.019
***
 0.020
**
 
 (3.81) (3.50) (2.69) (5.91) (2.97) (2.06) 
       
Religious group member -0.033
**
 -0.012 -0.029 0.004 -0.066
***
 -0.071
***
 
 (-2.61) (-0.63) (-1.18) (0.17) (-4.17) (-2.92) 
Voluntary group member 0.026
* 
0.027 0.090
***
 0.058
**
 0.070
***
 0.057
**
 
 (1.73) (1.37) (3.81) (2.12) (3.17) (2.06) 
       
Contact with local councilor 0.047
**
 0.099
***
 0.065 0.070
* 
0.060
**
 0.028 
 (2.12) (3.59) (1.62) (1.68) (2.40) (0.64) 
Contact with MP 0.008 0.012 0.065
* 
0.098
**
 0.024 0.098
**
 
 (0.40) (0.50) (1.66) (2.26) (0.83) (2.31) 
Contact with gov. agency 0.007 -0.002 -0.006 -0.085
* 
-0.025 -0.112
**
 
 (0.45) (-0.11) (-0.18) (-1.87) (-0.97) (-2.56) 
Contact with political party -0.005 0.002 -0.032 -0.026 0.053
**
 0.017 
 (-0.28) (0.11) (-0.83) (-0.63) (2.62) (0.36) 
       
Control variables Yes       Yes        Yes       Yes Yes        Yes 
  N 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 
z statistic in parentheses. Robust standard errors used. Significant at 
*
 10%; 
**
 5%; 
***
 1% 
Source: Afro-barometer survey (2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
